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Abstract:
This study investigates whether the information content of insider transactions, with
a focus on sell transactions, is different for high growth, high volatility Internet-based
firms. Prior research on more “traditional” firms has found a small, but significant
negative abnormal return with insider sells, which points to an association of insider
sells with negative information about the firm by outsiders. We employ several
models to examine over 1,000 inside transactions for more than 100 NETDEX firms to
find that for Internet firms, insider sells are not followed by a significant negative
abnormal return. Firm size effects differ between the different methods employed. In
conclusion, it appears that while insider sales in traditional firms are motivated by
information asymmetry reason, insider sales in Internet firms are not. We conclude
that Internet firms are different indeed.1
ARE INTERNET FIRMS DIFFERENT?
EVIDENCE FROM INSIDER TRADING
1. Introduction
This paper analyzes whether insider transactions in Internet firms differ from those
in “traditional” firms. Are Internet firms different? Sure, they are high growth and
high volatile stocks, but they are not the only ones with these characteristics. A
number of recent papers find that at least there is something special about them.
Arosio et al. (2000) find that Internet-stock IPOs are substantially underpriced.
Junttila (2001) and Ofek and Richardson (2001) find that market rationality appears to
be limited in the Internet-stock sector. The valuation of Internet firms is tough, which
makes it also hard to accurately assess a company’s stock price as the stock price is
supposed to reflect the firm’s ultimate value.
One way to gain information about the accurateness of a stock price is to analyze
insider-trading patterns for that stock. Seyhun (1998ab) explores the value of insider
trading to assess how a company is performing. He finds that on average insiders
have proved prescient. According to Seyhun’s extensive research, stocks that are
bought by insiders outperform the market by 4.5% and stocks sold by insiders under-
perform the market by 2.7%. Insider trading can thus offer some indication of a firm’s
“true” value, which indicates the importance of understanding the information
content of such transactions. For “traditional” firms, insider trading has meant
something quite logical as inside sells point to a current overvaluation and inside
buys to an undervaluation of the stock. Insider trades in these firms are motivated by
information asymmetry reason. Insider trading in Internet firms may, however, mean
something quite different than insider trading in more traditional firms. For Internet
firms, stock price volatility is high and insider ownership extensive, which makes the
wealth-position of the manager quite risky. If the firm performs poorly or even fails,2
managers might not just lose their income but also a large part of their personal
wealth. Insider sales in Internet firms may produce positive excess returns.
Diversification rather than instant profit seeking will then be a motive for inside
trades by managers of Internet firms, a proposition this paper will seek to explore. To
this extent, we will account for firm size in relation to insider trading in Internet
stocks. In case diversification is an important motive, this would be reflected in more
positive excess returns for smaller firms. However, if this relationship cannot be
established, it suggests, once again, that market rationality is limited in Internet
stocks.
Our study is related to Meulbroek’s (2000) research, who looks after the
compensation of executives in Internet firms. She finds that sales in Internet-based
companies do not produce negative excess returns. As such, it appears that market
participants do not, on average, interpret managerial sales in Internet-based firms as
a signal of overvaluation. In her opinion, it is the lack of diversification, combined
with the high volatility of Internet-based firms, and the limited control managers
have over that volatility, that gives managers the incentive to diversify by selling
their stock holdings. In general, our research confirms Meulbroek’s results, as we find
that most insider sells in internet-based firms are not followed by negative abnormal
returns. However, we can’t find support for the interpretation that it is diversification
that drives this result. We use various models to derive our results. Our database
consists of 114 NETDEX firms, against 58 firms from Hambrecht and Quist's Internet
Index with Meulbroek. To assess the diversification motive, we also investigate firm
size effects. We analyze a different and more recent time period than Meulbroek
(1999-2000 versus 1996-1998). Our paper is complementary to Meulbroek’s in that it
derives almost identical results with respect to excess returns, but for a lot more firms
and by using different models. As such, it appears that our results are a lot more
robust. But in contrast to Meulbroek, on the basis of our analysis of firm-size effects,
we can not conclude that diversification by managers is responsible for the findings.
There remains considerable scope for irrational (“hype”) behavior in Internet stock3
valuation. As such, our findings are more in line with those from other research after
Internet firms (e.g. Arosio et al., 2000; Junttila, 2001; Ofek and Richardson, 2001).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main research on
insider trading and stock price reactions to provide a benchmark for the results of
this study. Section 3 describes the methodology and data employed. The results are
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 gives the conclusions of this study.
2. Previous Research on Insider Trading and Stock Price Reactions
The relation between stock prices and insider transactions has been an area of
research that has provoked considerable interest. The logical relationship between
the two variables seems to be, when it is assumed that the insiders are profit seekers,
that they will sell their companies’ stock when they think it is overvalued and buy it
when they think it is undervalued. This insider trading will then have an effect on
the firm’s stock-price due to the perceived information content of the insider
transactions by outsiders, with sell-transactions accelerating the price downwards
and buy-transactions accelerating the price upwards. The relationship of sell
transactions being accompanied by a negative price reaction and buy transactions by
a positive price reaction turns out to be less striking than one might expect. This is
caused mainly by the extensive regulations intended to prevent insiders from
profiting from their exclusive position. In the United States, the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the Williams Act Amendments of 1968 are the primary pieces of
legislation to regulate insider trading. These regulations mainly pertain to the
definition of insiders, trading by insiders and disclosure of information on holdings
and transactions of insiders. The logical relationship holds throughout most
academic research, even though the magnitude of the effect is sometimes very small.
Several variations have been made in the study of the relation between insider
transactions and stock price movements. Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), Jaffe (1974),4
and Seyhun (1986) look at insider trading and firm-specific future price movements.
Lorie and Niederhoffer are the first to use exact data (for example, daily price
fluctuations instead of monthly price fluctuations) as they investigate stock
performance when there is an excess of two or more buyers or sellers among insiders
of a company in the preceding month. In their sample of about 8,000 transactions,
they find that insiders tend to sell more often than usual before a price decrease and
buy more often than usual before a price increase. Jaffe investigates a random sample
of about 1,000 trading months covering 200 large firms in the period 1962-1968. He
finds that insiders trade with abnormal returns of about 2.5% (of the total return)
over outsiders and he also concludes that the Official Summary of the SEC contains
information on possible future stock prices. This latter finding is inconsistent with a
true efficient market in which prices “fully reflect” available information (see also
Fama, 1970). Seyhun studies approximately 60,000 transactions from 1971-1981 and
finds that, on average, corporate insider sells are accompanied by a statistically
significant negative excess return of around 0.9% over the month following the
month in which the insider sell takes place.
Chowdhurry et al. (1993) and Seyhun (1992, 1998ab) look at aggregate insider trading
and its effect on aggregate stock returns.  The former analyze about 140,000
transactions over the 1975-1986 period and conclude that there is some predictive
content associated with aggregate insider trading but that the magnitude is small.
Seyhun (1992), in contrast, finds in his pool of about 845,000 transactions a strong
relationship between the aggregate net number of open market purchases and sells
by corporate insiders in their own company and future aggregate stock returns for
the 1975-1989 period. Seyhun explains the predictive ability of aggregate insider
trading by changes in business conditions and movements away from fundamentals.
Seyhun (1998a) adds that insiders are best positioned to interpret the implications of
macroeconomic developments for their own firms and thus for their own firm’s stock
prices. This should also hold for the aggregate, which Seyhun concludes that it does.
Richardson and Venkatesh (1995) look specifically at insider trading and long-run
return performance. They investigate about 100,000 transactions for 1980-1987 and
find that insider transactions have both a long-term anticipatory and a reactive5
component with all of the results driven by the timing of insider sells, as opposed to
purchases. Meulbroek (1992) examines illegal insider trading. The study-sample
consists of individuals charged with insider trading by the SEC in civil cases during
the period 1980-1989. According to the SEC, illegal insider transactions are those
made on the basis of material information that the investor possesses or should
posses and which is not available to the investing public. Meulbroek finds that the
stock market detects illegal insider trading and includes a large portion of the
information into the stock-price before such trading information becomes public.
All of the previously mentioned studies have been on what we call “traditional”
firms. With the exception of Meulbroek (2000), very little research has been done on
the effects of insider trading on stock prices of firms whose primary turnover is
generated through the Internet. Meulbroek analyzes insider transactions in 58
Internet-based firms during 1996-1998. She finds that sales in these companies do not
produce negative excess returns. For an Internet-based firm, the mean return on an
insider selling day is +0.82%, net-of-market movements. Meulbroek argues this result
suggests that market participants do not regard managerial sales in Internet firms as
a signal of overvaluation. The relatively high incidence of managerial sales in
Internet-based firms may instead reflect the high value managers place on holding a
diversified portfolio. From this, Meulbroek argues that the compensation-mix of
managers might not be optimal. Related is the study by Schultz and Zaman (2001).
They examine the motives of Internet firms for going public. To this extent, they
examine the behavior of the individuals closest to them, such as their managers,
underwriters and venture capitalists. Schultz and Zaman find only weak evidence
that these firms are going public to take advantage of irrationally high prices. They
find that Internet firms are hurrying to go public to grab market share.
Internet firms differ from traditional firms as returns tend to be considerably more
volatile, and growth can be much more extreme. Insiders own on average a larger
percentage of the firm. Furthermore, a senior executive in an Internet firm is
frequently financially dependent upon his or her firm in two ways, namely income-
wise and wealth-wise. A fair share of the executive’s wealth usually consists of6
shares in the firm, especially since growth in Internet firms that have not failed has
been high. The personal wealth of the executive will fluctuate tremendously as stock
prices are very volatile and the executive has not diversified away against the
unsystematic risk of his or her portfolio. To lower risk, it is very important for such
an individual to diversify holdings and not have all the peas in one pie.
Diversification can be the leading motive for insider selling among internet-firm
executives, which sets them apart from executives in traditional firms.
This paper analyzes insider trading effects with Internet firms and managerial
diversification as the motive for these effects. The hypothesis this paper will try to
substantiate is that the information content of insider transactions in Internet firms
differs from the information content of insider transactions in traditional firms. We
will test this hypothesis by examining whether and how stock returns are related to
insider sells and how the investing public perceives sells in an Internet firm. In other
words, what information does such a trade convey about the firm. For traditional
firms, prior research has convincingly shown that insider selling is followed by
negative excess returns (Lorie and Niederhoffer, 1968; Seyhun, 1986). If similar
analysis of insider trading in internet firms shows that at least there is no negative
excess return associated with a sell, then evidence might be provided that the
information content is not negative and immediate profit is probably not the leading
motive in the case of Internet firms. According to Meulbroek (2000), diversification is
the most logical alternative motive. We try to test this idea as well. As such, we go
into a division of size to see whether the results are the same for small and large
firms. We postulate that in case diversification is the motive for selling shares, we
would witness a negative relationship between firm size and excess returns from
insider sells. Insider buys are included in the methodology as well, although insider
buys in Internet firms constitute only a very small part of the total of inside
transactions.7
3.  Methodology and Data
3.1 Methodology
There are four main motivations associated with inside trades. Insiders sell or buy
stock of their own firm when they think it is over- or undervalued, for diversification
purposes, for noise causing reasons, or for personal reasons. The latter two cannot be
investigated easily on a large scale and, in line with the other research done on the
topic (like Jaffe, 1974), are assumed only to add insignificantly to the results.
Information about the noise causing reasons will follow in the data-section. In order
to investigate the information contents of insider trades in Internet firms, this study
examines the relation between insider trades and the subsequent performance of a
security. The focus of the analysis is firm specific. Economy-wide aggregate effects,
illegal trades, and long-run price effects are not included. To improve the robustness
of the results, we will employ basically two different methods. The first method is
similar to the one used by Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968) and focuses on monthly price
fluctuations. The second method looks at daily price fluctuations resembling the
manner in which Seyhun (1986) looks at stock prices and insider trading; Meulbroek
(2000) also employs this approach. We will first discuss the similarities of the two
methods in data-analysis and the way in which excess returns are calculated. This
will be followed by an exposition of both methods.
The analysis will primarily focus on the signal (buy or sell) and not on the amount of
shares traded. One striking feature of the data is that there is great variation in the
number of shares traded. Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968) offer a logical explanation for
this phenomenon, namely that different kinds of insiders trade in significantly
different amounts of shares. This indicates that the size of the transaction does not
necessarily infer something about the importance of the information conveyed in the
trade as the size might just depend on who trades.8
With respect to excess (abnormal) returns, there are two primary techniques
mentioned in the literature.
1 The first technique (Method I) utilized by, for example,
Jaffe (1974), uses variations of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Seyhun
(1986) discusses this method and suggests that the CAPM overstates the abnormal
returns realized from insider trading, as there is a particular systematic bias in the
residuals. Extensive documentation and evidence of this bias can be found in
Reinganum (1981) who finds that the CAPM incorrectly specifies the equilibrium
pricing mechanism. Applied to the case of Internet firms, there are two more
objections to the use of the CAPM. As the returns and risks associated with Internet
firms are continuously changing, individual firm betas become hard to measure and
tointerpret. Also, as many firms in the NETDEX have only since recently been in
business, estimating beta from only a very limited pool of data may not be very
reliable. Therefore, we also employ Seyhun’s alternative methodology. This second
technique to calculate excess returns (Method II) is the net-of-market method in
which returns of stocks are netted with the return of a particular index or
combination of indices to assess how the stock performs compared to the market.
The net-of-market method does not exhibit any bias in residuals and does not
overstate abnormal returns. One downfall of the method is that results can be
influenced by the choice of index to represent the market. To minimize this influence,
we will use the net-of-market technique with two different indices representing the
market, the NETDEX and the NASDAQ.
Method I
Method I analyzes monthly stock price fluctuations and insider trading in a variety
of ways that we will assign I-1 (A, B and C) and I-2.
Variation I-1 analyzes insider trading before large price changes in a stock defined as
10% or more.  Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968) use an 8% cut-off, but as Internet stocks
are on average more volatile than the stocks in the subject pool of Lorie and
                                                          
1 Other techniques or models for the calculation of abnormal returns are the Scholes-
Williams model and the mean-returns adjusted model, see Seyhun (1986).9
Niederhoffer, we have raised that percentage with 25% to account for this
significantly larger volatility. Large price changes are particularly interesting as they
may constitute large gains or losses to traders and thus should amplify the
motivations of insiders. We look at insider transactions before large price changes in
three ways:
I-1A  Determine if the last transaction in the six months prior to the large price
change is a buy or sell action.
I-1B Determine if the number of buys minus the number of sells in the six months
prior to the large price change is positive or negative.
I-1C Determine if the number of shares bought minus the number of shares sold in
the six months prior to the large price change is positive or negative.
If there are no buys or sells before a large price change, that occurrence is excluded
from the analysis. This can, for example, be the case when a company has only been
in business for a short amount of time when such a price change occurs. For I-1B and
I-1C it holds that if the number of buys and sells or the number of shares bought and
sold is equal, then that occurrence is excluded from further analysis as well. For I-1B
this amounts to four occasions and for I-1C to three occasions.
To test the significance of the observed differences between price increases and
decreases in combination with buys and sells (I-1A), positive and negative
differences between numbers of buys minus sells (I-1B) or numbers of shares bought
minus sold (I-1C), a z-value is calculated. The observed sample fractions are tested
for statistical significance by using a simple inference method for fractions. The
expected sample fraction for the number of changes over the total number of
observations for both the buy and sell activity (I-1A) is 0.50 under the Null
hypothesis. This is because if it were solely up to chance whether we would observe
an occurrence of a buy or sell transaction before a large price change, we would
expect a buy occurrence in about 50% of the cases and a sell occurrence in about 50%
of the cases. This is analogous for I-1B and I-1C.10
Then, the z-value for I-1A, I-1B and I-1C is defined as follows:
z = (Þ – p0) / √  (p0 (1 - p0 ) / n)   (1)
Where Þ is the observed sample fraction with a price increase, p0 is the expected
fraction under the Null hypothesis, n is the number of observations. The significance
levels of the results are determined by calculating the corresponding p-value.
Variation I-2 looks at the price movement of a stock subsequent to the month in
which there is a clear insider trader signal. Similar to Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968),
we define a clear signal as an excess of either two or more buy transactions or two or
more sell transactions. By defining a clear signal as two or more trades, some
sporadic trades for personal reasons are excluded automatically. In a month in which
there is such a signal, the month-end price movement of the stock in comparison to
the month-end fluctuation in the NETDEX or NASDAQ is analyzed. Then, the
abnormal return for security i on day τ , ARi,τ , with τ  being the last day of the month
in which there is an excess of two or more buyers or sellers, is calculated as follows:
ARi,τ  = ri,τ  – rm,τ         (2)
Where ri,τ   is the with-dividend return to security i on day τ , and rm,τ  is the with
dividend return to a portfolio of either all NETDEX or all NASDAQ stocks on day τ .
All abnormal returns are then counted by signal (positive or negative). The expected
sample fraction for the number of months with a certain signal, thus in which the
stock outperforms the index or vice versa, is 0.50 under the Null hypothesis. This is
because if it were solely up to chance, with a clear inside trade signal, we would
expect to see the stock outperform the index in about 50% of the cases and the index
outperform the stock in about 50% of the cases. The significance of the results is
measured by a simple statistical test similar to the one used in method I-1 where z is
defined as follows:
z = (Þ* – p0) / √  (p0 (1 - p0 ) / n)     (3)11
Where Þ* is the observed sample fraction of cases in which the stock outperforms the
index, p0 is the expected fraction under the Null hypothesis, and n is the number of
observations. Significance levels of the results are determined by calculating the
corresponding P-value.
Method II
Based on the net-of-market model as used by Seyhun (1986), the abnormal return
ARi,t for security i, on insider trading day t is calculated as follows:
ARi,t = ri,t – rm,t     (4)
Where ri,t is the with-dividend return to security i on day t and rm,t is the with
dividend return to a portfolio of either all NETDEX or all NASDAQ stocks on day t.
Per security, abnormal returns are evaluated separately for sell and buy days, which
we will qualify as event days. An event day t is considered to be a sell day when the
number of sells exceeds the number of buys on that day for that particular security.
An event day is considered to be a buy day when the number of buys exceeds the
number of sells on that day for that particular security. If the number of sells equals
the number of buys on a particular event day, that day is excluded from the analysis.
For each event day, abnormal returns are calculated for days t-2, t-1, t, t+1, t+2 to
analyze the effects of possible information-leaking before a trade and possible lack of
complete efficient markets. With ARi,t-2 , ARi,t-1, ARi,t+1 and ARi,t+2 any anticipatory or
prolonged effects can be evaluated. Seyhun (1986) corrects for potential changes in
market parameters by adding two more parameters in the equation. As our research
period is ten times shorter than the period Seyhun evaluated, we will disregard
changes in market parameters, as they are likely to be negligible.
The average abnormal return for the instance of the event day, AARt, is calculated by
averaging the abnormal returns for all 114 securities for all event days of each
security.12
AARt = 1/Nk  ∑   ARi,t for k = sell or buy, for i = 1, 114, for t = 1, Nk    (5)
Where Nk is the number of event days with k denoting either sell event days or buy
event days. For this study, Nbuy is 91 and Nsell is 839. AARt-2, AARt-1, AARt+1 and AARt+2 are
also calculated. The expected value of each average abnormal return is zero. Any
observed deviation from zero should be tested for significance to evaluate whether
the observation is simply due to random chance or points to the presence of an
influential factor. The significance of the average abnormal returns is measured by
standardizing them by their sample standard error SE(AAR). The statistical t-value of
AARt is calculated as follows:
t-value = (AARt - µ 0) / (SE(AARt) / √ Nk)f o r  N k-1 degrees of freedom   (6)
Where µ 0 is the expected value of AARt which in this case equals zero.
3.2 Data
The research-population consists of all firms present in the NETDEX- index in the
period from March 31, 1999 to March 31, 2000 and from which stock-price
information is available through the Datastream resource.
2 This period has been
chosen based on the availability of the needed data free of charge. The NETDEX is a
regularly updated geometric average of more than 100 public companies whose
primary turnover is derived from the Internet.
3 Appendix 1 gives the key
characteristics of our sample of 114 firms. Summary statistics of the database are
presented in table 1. Almost all firms in the NETDEX are traded on the NASDAQ
exchange. Average insider ownership with NETDEX firms is rather high with almost
50%. In comparison, the average insider ownership of all firms in the S&P 500 is
                                                          
2 The following NETDEX companies were excluded on this basis: Adforce Inc.,
Comps.Com Inc., Walt Disney – Go.com, Mindspring Enterprises, Preview Travel
Inc., Telebanc Financial Corp., USweb Corporation, Worldtalk Communications,
Zdnet.
3 http://cfs.stockpoint.com/poppe/pages/netdex_profile.asp13
20.5%. Also, the average of the available beta’s of the sample lies around 2, which is
very high if one considers that the average market beta is 1 and for example the
average beta of S&P 500 firms is 0.98 during our research period. This finding
supports the view that the returns of Internet firms are very volatile when compared
to the average mainstream firm.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires insiders to report any
transactions they make in their own company’s stock within 10 days following the
last day of the month in which the trading occurred. Insiders are defined as officers,
directors, and owners of at least 10 percent of any class of common stock. This
information is publicly available through publications of the SEC, the Wall Street
Journal, the Insiders Chronicle, and numerous financial web-sites.
4 The data for this
paper on insider transactions comes from the widely used and cited source
http://www.insidertrader.com. As data on insider transactions are only free of
charge for a period of 13 months through this source, this analysis has been done
over a period of one year. Note that only “legal” insider transactions are thus
included in this analysis, as illegal insider transactions are very unlikely to have been
reported to the SEC. The data on stock prices was gathered from Datastream.
This study only includes open market transactions, which is consistent with most
other studies on insider transactions. Open market transactions are transactions
made on an exchange, usually through a broker. Non open-market transactions, such
as trades related to gifts or dividends, are very clearly marked on
http://www.insidertrader.com and are excluded, as they are less likely to have been
induced by information signals according to existing literature. Option purchases are
also excluded as their meaning is highly questioned in the literature, and they are
nearly always excluded from analysis as well. For the research sample, a total of
                                                          
4 For example, http://www.CBS.marketwatch.com, http://www.Quicken.com,
http://www.insidertrader.com, http://investor.msn.com,
http://www.thomsoninvest.net, http://quote.yahoo.com.14
2,043 transactions is studied, of which 649 are excluded as they are option purchases.
Of the remaining 1,394 transactions, 91.5% is a sell transaction and 8.5% is a buy.
[ INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ]
Table 1 gives the characteristics of our data sample and shows a breakdown by firm
size. The first notable characteristic is that some firms in the sample are very large
compared to others. The sample ranges from do-it-at-home companies to huge
multinationals with more than 12,000 employees. A breakdown of the results
according to firm size does not seem like a wasted luxury with such diversity. Firm
size is measured before the event data. The number of shares traded per transaction
and the total number of insider transactions per firm during the research period
show an increasing trend with increasing firm size. The buy-to-sell ratio shows a
decreasing trend with increasing firm size. Slight deviations from these trends can be
explained by the presence of outliers. One such clear example is, for example, the
buy-to-sell ratio of 0.64 in the >100 Million-<250 Million group. Cobalt Group Inc.
and Cyberian Outpost Inc. both have a considerable number of insider buys, which
heavily influences the buy to sell ratio. If these two are left out of the sample, a buy to
sell ratio of 0.26 results, which follows the observed trend very well. The amount of
insider sells is much larger than the amount of insider buys. As mentioned before,
the average percentage of sell transactions of all firms is about 91% which is
considerably larger than, for example, the average percentage of sell transactions of
all firms found by Seyhun (1992) of about 50%.
The following can cause possible errors in the data set or constitute possible grounds
for noise in the results: Insiders might mistakenly not accurately fill out forms 3, 4, or
5 from the SEC in which they report their inside transactions, or the SEC might
transpose the data incorrectly. An insider may also purposefully try to play with the
rules and price reactions by letting friends or relatives trade on their special
information, as there is no reporting requirement to reveal these kinds of trades.
Other ways to play with the rules are reciprocal passing of information by insiders of
different companies, making random trades to camouflage the ones that are made on15
special information and what Jaffe (1974) calls “gamesmanship”: As insiders will
know what effect their behavior can have on stock prices they might, for example,
just start buying their own stock with the hope that outsiders will drive up the price
by starting to buy as well. We have checked the data for noticeable errors such as
when insider trades supposedly take place when the company is not even in
existence yet.
5  It is very hard to control for such things as trading by friends and
relatives or gamesmanship so it is to hope that these will not significantly influence
the results. The authors discussed in section 2 have not incorporated these factors
either for the simple reason that it is rarely possible to acquire the information to take
them into account.
                                                          
5 For the companies Fashionmall.com Inc., FlashNet Communications, Cobalt Group
Inc., Quokka Sports Inc., TiVo Inc. and Homestore.com Inc., one or two of the
reported transactions were eliminated for this reason.
4. Results
4.1 Overall results
We will discuss the results of this study in several layers. First, we discuss the overall
results, then we go into the effect of firm size, deviations form the event day (with
Method II), and inside buys. The main focus of this paper and its hypothesis is on sell
transactions for all firms in the sample, with for method II an emphasis on event day
t.  The first important observation that has been made earlier in the paper is that,
contrary to the findings of studies on traditional firms, for example Seyhun (1992),
insider sells clearly dominate over insider buys in Internet firms. Of the total amount
of transactions analyzed in this study, 91.5% is a sell action. With respect to the
choice for the event-day itself as benchmark used for comparison in method II, the
following can be said. Most studies found that markets work efficiently in the case of
insider trading, which means that the price adjustment is immediate after the trade.16
To be able to compare the results for Internet firms with the results for traditional
firms, event day t warrants the closest observation. To provide more depth to the
analysis, the influence of division in size of firm, the effect of deviations from day t
and an exposition of the results for buy actions will also follow.
[ INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE ]
Table 2 provides a summary for sell trades in all firms for all methods with the
results and significance level and the appropriate conclusions. Method I-1A finds
that sells are followed by a large price increase in about 54% of the cases, which is
significant at the 90% level. Method I-1B finds that when the number of sells exceeds
the number of buys in the six months preceding a large price change, then this price
change is an increase in about 54% of the cases. This result is even significant at the
95% level. Method I-1C finds, with a significance of 90%, that when the number of
shares sold exceeds the number of shares bought in the six months prior to a large
price change, then this price change is an increase in about 54% of the cases. The
underlying data for method I-1 can be found in table 3 in which the total number of
cases are presented for each type of insider activity and price change with the
corresponding z- and p-values. For example, for the “all firms” category under
method I-1A, large price increases are followed by sells in 274 instances and large
price decreases are followed by sells in 235 instances. This difference is unlikely to be
only due to chance as the result carries a z-value of 1.73, a p-value of 0.084 and thus a
significance level of 90%. The results for method I-1 support our hypothesis as they
provide (some) evidence that insider sells are followed by a positive price reaction,
which contrasts with the results of Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968) for traditional
firms. Lorie and Niederhoffer find in their study that a sell happens more often
before a price decrease and their results are highly significant with a p-value smaller
than 0.0005. As can be seen from table 2, Method I-2 shows with both the NETDEX
and the NASDAQ as the reference-index, a slight upper hand of negative abnormal
returns. This result is insignificant, which indicates that no evidence is provided that
sells are structurally followed by a negative abnormal return as the observation can
be due to random chance.17
[ INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE ]
Table 4 gives the exact number of cases for when the stock performs better or worse
than the NETDEX or NASDAQ in the case of an excess of two or more sellers (or
buyers). In total, there are 237 instances in the sample in which there is a month with
an excess of two or more sellers, of which 116 (NETDEX) or 115 (NASDAQ) are cases
in which the stock outperforms the market index.  These two numbers deviate only
slightly from the number of instances that is expected under the Null hypothesis,
namely 118.5 (50% of 237). The corresponding z-values of the deviations of 116 and
115 from 118.5 are –0.32 and –0.45 respectively, which clearly points to
insignificance. Thus the Null hypothesis cannot be rejected and no other reason than
a chance-event is supported to explain the minor deviations from the 50% mark. To
support the hypothesis that insider sells (transactions) in Internet firms do not carry
the same information contents as with traditional firms, the results should at least not
show a significant number of negative abnormal returns, which is indeed the case
with the results for this method. In comparison, Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968) find
for traditional firms 124 instances of months with an excess of two or more sellers, of
which only 43 are cases with the stock outperforming the market. The corresponding
z-value is –3.41, which points to a highly significant result of a dominance of
negative abnormal returns following inside sells.
For the net-of-market method (method II), table 4 shows that insider sells are
accompanied on the event day by a positive abnormal return of 1.40% for the
NETDEX and 1.37% for the NASDAQ as reference-index. These results are highly
significant with t-values of 4.89 and 4.73 respectively. For each of the transactions,
the abnormal return of the stock-price on that particular day (and the four days
surrounding that day) is calculated with both the NETDEX and NASDAQ. From this
information for all individual firms, the AAR and its standard error are calculated for
“all firms”. The results for this method support our hypothesis and seem to point to a
conclusion opposite to Seyhun (1986), who presents a negative abnormal return with
insider sells in the case of traditional firms. He finds a negative abnormal return of18
0.9% with a t-value of –3.3. As such, it appears that in the case of sells abnormal
returns for Internet firms behave quite differently to abnormal returns for traditional
firms.
In the design of the methodology, we decided to use two indices to represent the
market to improve the robustness of the results. In retrospect, we observe that the
results of method I-2 and method II are similar for both the NETDEX and NASDAQ.
This is not very surprising as almost all firms in the NETDEX are on the NASDAQ
too. The NASDAQ is, however, far more encompassing than the NETDEX. The
movements of the two composites are quite similar with peaks and valleys moving
synchronously on most days. The fluctuations in the NETDEX, however, are much
more extreme. The daily fluctuations in the value of the NETDEX over the research
period have a standard deviation of 3.40% as compared to the NASDAQ with a
standard deviation of the daily fluctuations of 1.86%. The results of this research are
not very susceptible to the differences in fluctuation volatility between the two
indices.
The fact that positive abnormal returns can be observed is harder to explain from the
existing theory than the fact that no significant negative abnormal returns are
present. A possible explanation for a positive price reaction after an inside sell could
be limited market rationality in the Internet stock market (see also Junttila, 2001, and
Ofek and Richardson, 2001). As insider ownership is high, the public float of Internet
firm shares tends to be low. When an insider sells, shares suddenly become available
to the investing public to buy. Afraid to miss out on this opportunity, demand might
rise after the short-lived increase in supply and the price could move up for a short
time period.
In summary, all (variations of) methods show results for Internet-based firms that
clearly differ from what has been found in previous research on “traditional” firms.
Through the years, research has found that inside sells give a negative signal about a
traditional firm. For Internet firms, method I-2 shows no significant negative
abnormal return. Methods I-1 and II even show a result that directly contradicts the19
view that sells give a negative signal about the performance of the firm, as price
increases and highly significant positive abnormal returns are observed immediately
after an inside sell. Comparability of prior research and this study might falter
because the time period covered is not exactly the same, the reference indexes are not
fully equal and the methodologies might differ slightly. With respect to the time
period, Lorie and Niederhoffer already found negative information signals with
inside sells in 1968, as did Seyhun (1986, 1992, 1998a). With respect to the index used,
Seyhun’s last two studies included the NASDAQ index as one of the references for
the market. With respect to methodology, slight alterations have been made to the
Lorie and Niederhoffer method and the Seyhun method, but they have been justified
in this paper. Results for studies on inside trades and price reactions have generally
also proved quite robust for differences in methodology as with the wide variety of
methods employed the results are surprisingly close in concurrence. Thus, assuming
that the results for traditional firms can be transposed to the situation of this study
with slightly different parameters, the hypothesis that insider sells (transactions) in
Internet firms do not carry the same information contents as for “traditional” firms is
supported. As such, we may conclude that Internet firms are different indeed.
The methods I-1, I-2 and II do differ in the level of how much they show a different
result from what has been found for traditional firms. It is hard to pinpoint one exact
reason why method I-2 might not provide such strong evidence as the other
methods. One reason might be I-2 is the method with the lowest number of cases.
With respect to sells, method I-1 has an N of about 500, method I-2 carries an N of
237 and for method II, N is 839. The influence of this factor on the results is hard to
estimate exactly. What can be said is that Lorie and Niederhoffer find very strong
evidence for associating sells with negative abnormal returns and our study for
Internet firms very clearly shows results in method I-2 that do not support that same
conclusion. Thus, it appears that we may conclude that Internet firms differ from
“traditional” ones when it comes to the effect of insider trading. Meulbroek (2000)
argues this mainly is because of the diversification motive with its management. The
next subsection will go into this matter.20
4.2 The Effect of Firm Size
Seyhun (1986) finds a clear negative relation between the abnormal returns to
insiders and firm size. However, when the size of the Internet-based firms is taken
into account, some interesting results can be observed. Table 3 shows that methods I-
1A, I-1B and I-1C give a significant result for the smallest group of firms (<100
Million) that does not match the result for “all firms”.  Sells, positive net number of
sells and positive number of net shares sold are followed by a large price increase in
only 29% (I-1A, I-1B) or 26% (I-1C) of the cases. These results are significant at the
95% level. For the smallest group of firms, the hypothesis of this paper is clearly not
supported. For the middle groups of firms, the results are mostly not significant at
all, but noticeable is that in general the results are increasingly supportive of the
hypothesis the larger the firm becomes. The largest two groups show that sells,
positive net number of sells and positive number of net shares sold, are followed by a
large price increase in 57% to 63% of the cases. For the group >2 Billion-<10 Billion,
these results are significant at the 90% level. For the >10 Billion group, the results are
significant at the 95% level. Figure 1 shows the sample fractions by size group for
methods I-1A, I-1B and I-1C and illustrates the trend of increasing sample fraction
with increasing firm size. This seems to be contradicting the diversification motive
with Internet firms, as put forward by Meulbroek (2000). From this motive, it would
follow that it are the smallest firms whose managers are least diversified. Hence, one
would expect the largest positive price effects with insider sells in the smallest firms.
However, our study does not confirm this idea.
[ INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ]
As can be seen in table 4, method I-2 leads to only one significant result for sell trades
in all of the size categories. In the group >100 Million-<250 Million, with the
NETDEX representing the market, the stock outperforms the market in only one out
of eight cases when there is an excess of two or more sellers. This result does not
support the diversification motive either. It must, of course, be scrutinized quite21
carefully as it is based on only eight cases. All other results of method I-2 provide a
fraction of cases when the stock outperforms the market that moves close around the
50% mark. Any deviations from 50% that are observed are insignificant.
[ INSERT TABLE 5 AND FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ]
The results of method II in table 5 for all size-groups show a positive abnormal
return with a sell trade, with both the NETDEX and NASDAQ as reference index.
These results are in line with the results for the “all firms” category. Only from the
>250 Million-<750 Million group on do the results carry (some) significance. There is
no clear pattern in the size of the abnormal returns with increasing firm size, neither
for the NETDEX nor the NASDAQ, as can be seen in figure 2. Noticeable is that the
average abnormal return of the smallest size-group is very high compared to the
average abnormal return of the largest size-group.
Thus, where Seyhun (1986) finds a significant negative relation between the
abnormal returns to insiders and the firm size, such an observation cannot be made
for the Internet firm sample. Applying Lorie and Niederhoffer’s model, we find that
there is a positive relation between the two. Applying Seyhun’s net-of-market model,
we can not establish a clear or significant pattern between firm size and insider
returns. Both findings contrast with the diversification motive as put forward by
Meulbroek (2000). This motive would result in a negative (or increasingly smaller
positive) and significant relationship between firm size and the price effects of
insider deals in Internet firms.
4.3 Deviations from the Event Day
Table 5 shows the results for method II with deviations from the event day. Average
abnormal returns with their corresponding t- and P-value are calculated for days t-2,
t-1, t+1 and t+2. These results show certain patterns. Previous research has paid little
attention to results for deviations from t, as markets repeatedly have been found to
function efficiently in the case of insider trading. We would like to make a few22
comments about our findings for the results on the days before and after the event
day because this can be a fruitful area for further research as it deals directly with the
much-debated topic of market efficiency. For the “all firms” category, days t-2 and t-1
show significant positive abnormal returns for the NETDEX of 0.41% and 0.83%. The
abnormal return increases with the approach to the event day, which might point to
information about the inside trade becoming public before the trade occurs. Some
companies, for example Microsoft, are known to announce inside trades of their
managers way in advance and some companies even have set days announced in
their Annual Report on which managers will trade own shares. We do not know to
what degree this is the case for the firms in the research sample. The same trend of
positive abnormal returns up to day t is seen in the case of the NASDAQ
representing the market. Interesting is that on day t+2 a significant negative
abnormal return of 0.48% is observed. This result is not in support of the hypothesis
that inside sells are not a negative signal about the firm if the market is not efficient
in its incorporation of new information in stock prices. It must be said that the
further a day deviates from event day t, the more likely it is that other news, trades
or actions influence the size and signal of abnormal returns. Seyhun (1986) finds
insufficient pattern in his results for deviations from the event day and draws
conclusions on his findings for the shortest time-period around the event day, thus
assuming market efficiency. For the deviations from day t for the different size
groups, no clear patterns can be observed among the significant results.
4.4 Inside Buys
[ INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE ]
A summary of the results for buys is in table 6. Buy data are also in tables 3 through
5, which can all be interpreted in a similar manner as for sell transactions.  Method I-
1A shows that buys are followed by a large price increase in 44% of the cases, a result
that is not significant as the z-value is –1.07. Method I-1B shows that when the
number of buys exceeds the number of sells in the six-month period prior to a large
price change, then the price change is an increase in about 42% of the cases. This23
result has a z-value of –1.56 and is not significant either. Method I-1C shows that
when the amount of shares bought exceeds the number of shares sold in the six-
month period preceding a large price change, then the change is an increase in about
44% of the cases, an insignificant result with a z-value of –1.10. Method I-2 shows an
insignificant result for the NETDEX, but a highly significant result for the NASDAQ
as reference index. In the case of a month with an excess of two or more buy
transactions for a particular stock, that individual stock outperforms the market as
represented by the NASDAQ in about 17% of the cases, a result with a z-value of
0.021 and a significance of 95% level. However, this result comes from only 12 cases,
as it occurred only 12 times in the whole sample that a month had an excess of two or
more buys. Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968) find for method I-1 the highly significant
result that buys happen more often before a price increase. For method I-2 they find
(for traditional firms) 55 instances of months with an excess of two or more buyers, of
which 36 are cases with the stock outperforming the market. The corresponding z-
value is 2.29, which points to a highly significant result of dominance of positive
abnormal returns following inside buys.
Under method II, a slight positive abnormal return accompanies insider buys of 0.63
(NETDEX) and 0.73 (NASDAQ). These abnormal returns have t-values of 0.87 and
0.82 respectively and, thus, are not significant. In comparison, Seyhun (1986) finds
(for traditional firms) a positive abnormal return of 1.1% for inside buys and this
return is highly significant. In summary, none of the methods, with the exception of
I-2 (NASDAQ), present significant results for inside buys. A division in size-groups
leads to no significant results in any of the size groups with any of the methods on
event day t. Deviation from t leads to some significant results in the “all firms”
category as the results move from negative abnormal returns before the event day to
positive abnormal returns from day t through t+2 for both the NETDEX and
NASDAQ. Perhaps an inside buy in Internet-based firms provides a positive signal
for outside investors about the firm that is similar to traditional firms. The
information content of inside buys in Internet firms might provide an interesting area
for further research as they seem to match traditional firms, contrary to the case of
insider sells.24
5. Conclusion
Evaluation of inside trade patterns has proven useful for analyzing the stock prices
of traditional firms for which prior research has found that inside sells give out a
negative signal about the company (see Lorie and Niederhoffer, 1968; Seyhun, 1986).
When insiders in such firms sell, it points to overvaluation of the stock for outsiders
and a negative abnormal return results. Internet firms differ in two very important
aspects from traditional firms as insider ownership is extensive and volatility high.
These two characteristics lead to a very risky position for the manager as both
income and wealth are subject to large fluctuations and even instant loss. In this
respect, it has been suggested that diversification might be the leading motive for
inside trades by managers of Internet firms (see Meulbroek, 2000). From this, it
follows that if inside sells do not have negative information content, no negative
abnormal return should be observed.
We both investigate the effects of insider trading in Internet firms and the
diversification motive. First, we use various methods to analyze over 1,000 insider
deals in 114 NETDEX firms during 13 months. We find that no negative abnormal
return can be observed with inside sells. Of the five (sub-) methods employed, only
one gives an insignificant result. The other four even show positive price reactions
and positive abnormal returns with an inside sell, irrespective of the index used to
represent the market. Another indication that insider transactions in Internet-based
firms probably have a different meaning than they do in traditional firms is the large
amount of inside sells as opposed to inside buys in Internet firms. For traditional
firms, inside buys and sells are about 50-50 in the composition of inside trades,
whereas for Internet-based firms this split moves to around the 90-10 mark. Inside
sells dominate among inside transactions and thus the informational content of
inside transactions is almost exclusively associated with sells.25
Second, we investigate diversification as an explanation for the non-negative effect of
insider sells. To this extent, we use firm size as a proxy for the extent to which the
firm’s manager is diversified in wealth and income. The notion behind this is the idea
that it is likely that the managers of the smallest Internet-based firms are likely to be
the ones that are least diversified. From our dataset, it appears is that the buy/sell
ratio decreases when firm size increases. When sells start to become more prominent
among insider transactions, no negative signal is observed and the diversification
motive seems to be supported. But apart from this casual observation, there is no
sound empirical basis for the diversification motive. We investigated sample
fractions with a price increase as well as average abnormal groups for different firm
sizes. For both methods, we find no clear and significant relation between firm size
and the size of the price effects of insider deals. Thus, it appears that there is no
support for the hypothesis that there is a significant and negative relation between
the abnormal returns to insiders and Internet firm size. Then, limited market
rationality is a more likely explanation for the observed price effects. This conclusion
is in line with other research after Internet firms (e.g. Arosio et al., 2000; Junttila,
2001; Ofek and Richardson, 2001). It appears that Internet firms are different indeed.26
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Table 1             Data Characteristics of the Research Sample
FIRM SIZE
>100m. >250m. >750m. >2b. >10b.
<100m. <250m. <750m. <2b. <10b. All Firms
Number of Firms in Sample 10 15 19 22 31 17 114
Market Capitalization Mean 65 175 415 1,148 4,331 31,385 6,177
          (03/2000, in millions) SD 29 46 109 342 2,067 36,742 17,534
Number of Shares Traded per Insider Transaction Mean 46,633 58,126 70,427 70,316 75,795 119,361 76,416
SD 51,838 84,707 109,116 72,498 62,011 141,667 91,014
Number of Insider Transactions per Firm Mean 4.4 4.3 8.3 8.5 14.6 28.8 12.2
          (31/3/1999-31/3/2000) SD 6.0 4.5 8.6 7.0 9.7 16.9 12.4
Buy to Sell Ratio 0.29 0.64 0.26 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.0929
Table 2 Summary of the Results for Sell Transactions
Method Results of the study Significance level Conclusions
Index z- or t- value p-value
I-1A In the case of large price changes, sells are followed
by a large price increase in about 54% of the cases.
1.73 0.084 The results are significant at the 90% level. They
provide some evidence that sells are followed by a
positive price reaction.
I-1B In the case of large price changes, when the number of sells exceeds
the number of buys in the six-month period preceding the change,
then the price change is an increase in about 54% of the cases.
1.97 0.049 The results are significant at the 95% level. They
provide evidence that sells are followed by a positive
price reaction.
I-IC In the case of large price changes, when the number of shares sold
exceeds the number of shares bought in the six-month period
preceding the change, then the price change is an increase in about
54% of the cases.
1.86 0.063 The results are significant at the 90% level. They
provide some evidence that sells are followed by a
positive price reaction.
NET-
DEX
In the case of a month with an excess of 2 or more sell transactions,
the stock outperforms the market in about 49% of the cases.
-0.32 0.749 The results are insignificant and thus do not provide
evidence that sells might be followed by a negative
abnormal return.
I-2
NAS-
DAQ
In the case of a month with an excess of 2 or more sell transactions,
the stock outperforms the market in about 49% of the cases.
-0.45 0.653 Idem.
NET-
DEX
Insider sells are accompanied by a positive abnormal
return of 1.40% on the event day itself.
4.89 << .0005 The results are highly significant. They provide
evidence for the opposite conclusion that Seyhun
made as he observed negative abnormal returns
II
NAS-
DAQ
Insider sells are accompanied by a positive abnormal
return of 1.37% on the event day itself.
4.73 << .0005 Idem.30
Table 3              Results per size group of methods I-1A, I-1B and I-1C
Firm Size Part Type of Insider Activity Price Change n z-value p-value
Increase Decrease
Sample Fraction
with Price Increase
Ho
fraction
(Number of (Number of
Changes) Changes)
Last Transaction Buy 3 8 11 0.27 0.50 -1.51 0.131 I-1A
Sell 8 20 28 0.29 0.50 -2.27 0.023
Number of Buys Minus Positive 3 8 11 0.27 0.50 -1.51 0.131 I-1B
Number of Sells Negative 8 20 28 0.29 0.50 -2.27 0.023
Number of Shares Bought Minus Positive 5 11 16 0.31 0.50 -1.50 0.134
< 100 mn
I-1C
Number of Shares Sold Negative 6 17 23 0.26 0.50 -2.29 0.022
Last Transaction Buy 6 11 17 0.35 0.50 -1.21 0.226 I-1A
Sell 15 26 41 0.37 0.50 -1.72 0.085
Number of Buys Minus Positive 6 13 19 0.32 0.50 -1.61 0.107 I-1B
Number of Sells Negative 15 24 39 0.38 0.50 -1.44 0.150
Number of Shares Bought Minus Positive 6 13 19 0.32 0.50 -1.61 0.107
> 100 mn
< 250 mn
I-1C
Number of Shares Sold Negative 15 24 39 0.38 0.50 -1.44 0.150
Last Transaction Buy 12 10 22 0.55 0.50 0.43 0.667 I-1A
Sell 24 30 54 0.44 0.50 -0.82 0.412
Number of Buys Minus Positive 13 8 21 0.62 0.50 1.09 0.276 I-1B
Number of Sells Negative 24 30 54 0.44 0.50 -0.82 0.412
Number of Shares Bought Minus Positive 10 8 18 0.56 0.50 0.47 0.638
>250 mn
<750 mn
I-1C
Number of Shares Sold Negative 26 32 58 0.45 0.50 -0.79 0.43031
Last Transaction Buy 11 12 23 0.48 0.50 -0.21 0.834 I-1A
Sell 56 40 96 0.58 0.50 1.63 0.103
Number of Buys Minus Positive 12 13 25 0.48 0.50 -0.20 0.841 I-1B
Number of Sells Negative 55 39 94 0.59 0.50 1.65 0.099
Number of Shares Bought Minus Positive 11 10 21 0.52 0.50 0.22 0.826
>750 mn
< 2 bn
I-1C
Number of Shares Sold Negative 56 42 98 0.57 0.50 1.41 0.159
Last Transaction Buy 7 7 14 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.000 I-1A
Sell 90 67 157 0.57 0.50 1.84 0.066
Number of Buys Minus Positive 5 9 14 0.36 0.50 -1.07 0.285 I-1B
Number of Sells Negative 88 66 154 0.57 0.50 1.77 0.077
Number of Shares Bought Minus Positive 4 3 7 0.57 0.50 0.38 0.704
> 2 bn
< 10 bn
I-1C
Number of Shares Sold Negative 92 69 161 0.57 0.50 1.81 0.070
Last Transaction Buy 0 1 1 0.00 0.50 -1.00 0.317 I-1A
Sell 81 52 133 0.61 0.50 2.51 0.012
Number of Buys Minus Positive 0 3 3 0.00 0.50 -1.73 0.084 I-1B
Number of Sells Negative 82 49 131 0.63 0.50 2.88 0.004
Number of Shares Bought Minus Positive 0 1 1 0.00 0.50 -1.00 0.317
> 10 bn
I-1C
Number of Shares Sold Negative 82 51 133 0.62 0.50 2.69 0.007
Last Transaction Buy 39 49 88 0.44 0.50 -1.07 0.285 I-1A
Sell 274 235 509 0.54 0.50 1.73 0.084
Number of Buys Minus Positive 39 54 93 0.42 0.50 -1.56 0.119 I-1B
Number of Sells Negative 272 228 500 0.54 0.50 1.97 0.049
Number of Shares Bought Minus Positive 36 46 82 0.44 0.50 -1.10 0.271
ALL
FIRMS
I-1C
Number of Shares Sold Negative 277 235 512 0.54 0.50 1.86 0.06332
Table 4 Results per size group of method I-2
Price Movements of Stock
Relative to Market
Firm Size Type of Insider Activity NETDEX NASDAQ
+ - + z-value p-value + - + z-value p-value
(number
 of cases)
(number
 of cases)
(fraction
 of cases)
(number
 of cases)
(number
 of cases)
(fraction
 of cases)
Excess of 2 or More Buyers 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - < 100 mn
Excess of 2 or More Sellers 2 5 0.29 -1.13 0.258 2 5 0.29 -1.13 0.258
Excess of 2 or More Buyers 2 2 0.50 0.00 1.000 1 3 0.25 -1.00 0.317 > 100 mn
< 250 mn Excess of 2 or More Sellers 1 7 0.13 -2.12 0.034 3 5 0.38 -0.71 0.478
Excess of 2 or More Buyers 1 2 0.33 -0.58 0.562 1 2 0.33 -0.58 0.562 >250 mn
<750 mn Excess of 2 or More Sellers 16 12 0.57 0.76 0.447 12 16 0.43 -0.76 0.447
Excess of 2 or More Buyers 1 1 0.50 0.00 1.000 0 2 0.00 -1.41 0.159 >750 mn
< 2 bn Excess of 2 or More Sellers 16 22 0.42 -0.97 0.332 19 19 0.50 0.00 1.000
Excess of 2 or More Buyers 0 2 0.00 -1.41 0.159 0 2 0.00 -1.41 0.159 > 2 bn
< 10 bn Excess of 2 or More Sellers 37 40 0.48 -0.34 0.734 36 41 0.47 -0.57 0.116
Excess of 2 or More Buyers 0 1 0.00 -1.00 0.317 0 1 0.00 -1.00 0.317 > 10 bn
Excess of 2 or More Sellers 44 35 0.56 1.01 0.312 43 36 0.54 0.79 0.430
Excess of 2 or More Buyers 4 8 0.33 -1.15 0.250 2 10 0.17 -2.31 0.021 ALL
FIRMS Excess of 2 or More Sellers 116 121 0.49 -0.32 0.749 115 122 0.49 -0.45 0.65333
Table 5 Results per size group of method II
FIRM SIZE NET-
DEX < 100 mn > 100 mn, < 250 mn > 250 mn, < 750 mn > 750 mn, < 2 bn > 2 bn, < 10 bn > 10 bn All Firms
AAR t-value P-value AAR t-value P-value AAR t-value P-value AAR t-value P-value AAR t-value P-value AAR t-value P-value AAR t-value P-value
t-2 1.94% 1.07 0.295 1.09% 0.63 0.533 -0.11% -0.16 0.873 0.67% 0.92 0.360 0.29% 0.97 0.333 0.40% 1.46 0.145 0.41% 2.04 0.042
t-1 0.60% 0.35 0.729 -2.36% -1.94 0.062 1.49% 1.70 0.093 1.78% 2.15 0.034 1.08% 3.16 0.002 0.38% 1.56 0.120 0.83% 3.85 0.000
t 8.04% 1.33 0.196 1.60% 1.03 0.311 2.43% 2.68 0.009 3.14% 3.62 0.000 0.75% 2.20 0.029 0.48% 1.81 0.071 1.40% 4.89 0.000
t+1 -2.61% -1.46 0.157 -0.43% -0.48 0.635 0.69% 0.81 0.420 0.26% 0.47 0.639 -0.15% -0.50 0.617 0.32% 1.30 0.195 0.08% 0.42 0.675
Sell
t+2 -0.94% -1.00 0.327 -0.56% -0.75 0.459 -0.73% -1.00 0.320 -0.26% -0.38 0.705 -0.40% -1.40 0.163 0.15% 0.62 0.536 -0.24% -1.34 0.181
t-2 -2.62% -2.05 0.071 -3.90% -4.16 0.000 -1.11% -0.70 0.492 -0.63% -0.67 0.512 1.27% 0.84 0.415 -3.14% -3.72 0.006 -1.66% -2.96 0.004
t-1 -1.38% -1.19 0.264 -0.11% -0.12 0.906 -1.71% -1.22 0.236 -1.10% -0.45 0.658 -2.61% -3.45 0.004 -1.23% -0.44 0.672 -1.29% -1.98 0.051
t 1.03% 0.48 0.643 -0.21% -0.16 0.874 0.17% 0.09 0.929 1.19% 0.70 0.493 1.56% 0.92 0.373 0.81% 0.27 0.794 0.63% 0.87 0.387
t+1 1.49% 0.44 0.670 -2.41% -2.58 0.017 3.32% 1.13 0.271 6.65% 1.78 0.093 1.40% 0.71 0.489 2.48% 0.89 0.399 2.01% 1.76 0.082
Buy
t+2 -2.84% -1.05 0.321 -1.65% -1.75 0.094 4.53% 1.71 0.102 3.63% 1.26 0.225 -0.78% -0.38 0.710 -0.83% -0.49 0.637 0.85% 0.87 0.387
FIRM SIZE . NAS-
DAQ < 100 mn > 100 mn, < 250 mn > 250 mn, < 750 mn > 750 mn, < 2 bn > 2 bn, < 10 bn > 10 bn All Firms
AAR t-value P-value AAR t-value P-value AAR t-value P-value AAR t-value P-value AAR t-value P-value AAR t-value P-value AAR t-value P-value
t-2 1.92% 1.00 0.327 0.81% 0.47   0.642 -0.29% -0.42 0.675 0.94% 1.25 0.214 0.35% 1.16 0.247 0.19% 0.64 0.523 0.36% 1.72 0.086
t-1 0.19% 0.10 0.921 -2.08% -1.68   0.103 1.34% 1.57 0.120 2.03% 2.38 0.019 1.11% 3.23 0.001 0.27% 0.97 0.333 0.81% 3.66 0.000
t 8.27% 1.35 0.189 2.01% 1.30   0.204 2.17% 2.34 0.021 3.28% 3.77 0.000 0.57% 1.69 0.092 0.55% 1.94 0.053 1.37% 4.73 0.000
t+1 -2.67% -1.47 0.154 -0.12% -0.13   0.897 0.48% 0.58 0.563 0.14% 0.25 0.803 -0.19% -0.57 0.569 -0.02% -0.07 0.944 -0.08% -0.42 0.675
Sell
t+2 -0.85% -0.84 0.409 -0.65% -0.90   0.375 -0.90% -1.30 0.197 -0.27% -0.37 0.712 -0.64% -1.85 0.065 -0.23% -0.91 0.364 -0.48% -2.46 0.014
t-2 -2.97% -2.37 0.042 -3.59% -3.72   0.001 -1.86% -1.34 0.195 -1.68% -1.36 0.192 1.80% 1.38 0.189 -4.27% -2.72 0.026 -1.99% -3.59 0.001
t-1 -1.67% -2.19 0.056 0.55% 0.52   0.608 -1.88% -1.18 0.251 -2.29% -0.89 0.386 -3.52% -3.76 0.002 -0.80% -0.25 0.809 -1.51% -2.10 0.038
t 1.36% 0.59 0.570 0.16% 0.12   0.906 -0.61% -0.33 0.745 1.10% 0.54 0.596 2.62% 0.76 0.460 0.91% 0.29 0.779 0.73% 0.82 0.414
t+1 0.58% 0.17 0.869 -2.63% -3.05   0.006 3.55% 1.24 0.229 6.42% 1.64 0.119 1.09% 0.60 0.558 2.09% 0.65 0.534 1.79% 1.56 0.122
Buy
t+2 -1.55% -0.57 0.583 -1.88% -2.10   0.047 3.76% 1.38 0.182 3.06% 0.98 0.341 -1.32% -0.60 0.558 -1.30% -0.78 0.458 0.51% 0.51 0.13534
Table 6 Summary of the Results for Buy Transactions
Method Reference Results of the study Significance level Conclusions
Index z- or t- value p-value
I-1A In the case of large price changes, buys are followed by a large
price increase in about 44% of the cases.
-1.07 0.285 The results are insignificant. No evidence that buys
are followed by a  positive or negative price reaction.
I-1B In the case of large price changes, when the number of buys
exceeds the number of sells in the six-month period preceding
the change, then the price change is an increase in about 42%
of the cases.
-1.56 0.119 The results are insignificant. They provide no
evidence that buys are followed by a positive or
negative price reaction.
I-IC In the case of large price changes, when the number of shares
bought exceeds the number of shares sold in the six-month
period preceding the change, then the price change is an
increase in about 44% of the cases.
-1.10 0.271 The results are insignificant. They provide no
evidence that buys are followed by a positive or
negative price reaction.
NETDEX In the case of a month with an excess of 2 or more buy
transactions, the stock outperforms the market in about 33% of
the cases.
-1.15 0.250 The results are insignificant and thus do not provide
evidence that buys are followed by a negative or
positive abnormal return.
I-2
NASDAQ In the case of a month with an excess of 2 or more buy
transactions, the stock outperforms the market in about 17% of
the cases.
-2.31 0.021 The results are significant at the 95% level. They
provide evidence that buys are followed by a
negative abnormal return.
NETDEX Insider buys are accompanied by a positive abnormal return of
0.63% on the eventday itself.
0.87 0.387 The results are insignificant. They do not provide
evidence for positive abnormal returns with insider
buys.
II
NASDAQ Insider buys are accompanied by a positive abnormal
return of 0.73% on the eventday itself.
0.82 0.414 Idem.35
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Appendix 1 Research Sample of 114 NETDEX
Companies
Source: http://www.insidertrader.com
Company Ticker Insider Beta Insider Sell Insider Buy Total Insider
Ownership (if known) Transactions Transactions Transactions
@Plan.Inc APLN 78.6% 2 0 2
24/7 Media Inc. TFSM 26.8% 3 0 3
About.com Inc. BOUT 40.2% 8 0 8
Allaire Corporation ALLR 35.0% 12 0 12
Alloy Online Inc. ALOY 53.0% 0 0 0
Amazon.com Inc. AMZN 61.0% 2.5 16 0 16
America Online Inc. AOL 2.0% 2.4 24 0 24
Ask Jeeves Inc. ASKJ 35.0% 2 0 2
Autobytel.com Inc. ABTL 79.2% 0 1 1
Autoweb.Com AWEB 72.9% 6 0 6
barnesandnoble.com inc. BNBN 0.9% 0 0 0
Bluefly Inc. BFLY 28.9% 1.3 0 2 2
Careerbuilder Inc. CBDR 76.0% 1 0 1
MarketWatch.com Inc. MKTW 75.2% 19 0 19
Cdnow Inc. CDNW 67.1% 2.5 2 0 2
Charter Communications CHTR 23.5% 0 5 5
Cheap Tickets Inc. CTIX 61.1% 4 0 4
Cmgi Inc. CMGI 30.0% 3 27 0 27
Cnet Networks Inc. CNET 63.0% 0.9 15 0 15
Concentric Network Corp. CNCX 41.1% 2.3 9 0 9
Concur Technologies Inc. CNQR 54.8% 11 4 15
Covad Communications Grp. COVD 73.7% 27 1 28
Critical Path Inc. CPTH 29.1% 22 0 22
Cybercash Inc. CYCH 44.1% 2.2 1 2 3
Cyberian Outpost Inc. COOL 50.9% 5 9 14
Cybershop.com Inc. CYSP 46.8% 4 0 4
Digital River Inc. DRIV 26.2% 26 1 27
DoubleClick Inc. DCLK 26.0% 3.8 24 0 24
E*Trade Group Inc. EGRP 45.0% 3.3 40 1 41
Earthlink Inc. ELNK 49.0% 1.9 6 1 7
Earthweb Inc. EWBX 49.5% 11 3 14
eBay Inc. EBAY 73.0% 38 0 38
Entrust Technologies ENTU 80.9% 15 1 16
eToys Inc. ETYS 65.0% 4 0 4
Excite @Home ATHM 74.0% 2.3 49 0 49
Exodus Communications EXDS 14.0% 2.8 51 0 51
Fashionmall.com Inc. FASH 49.3% 0 1 1
Fatbrain.com Inc. FATB 58.0% 2 0 2
Fvc.com Inc. FVCX 49.8% 15 3 18
FlashNet Communications FLAS 48.7% 0 1 138
Fundtech Ltd. FNDT 43.1% 0.4 2 0 2
Gemstar International Gr. GMST 44.0% 0.8 2 0 2
Global Sports Inc. GSPT 75.7% 0.4 0 0 0
GoTo.com Inc. GOTO 65.9% 0 0 0
Harbinger Corporation HRBC 18.9% 1.6 7 1 8
Healthon/WebMd Corp. HLTH 34.0% 11 9 20
HearMe Inc. HEAR 49.2% 10 14 24
homestore.com Inc. HOMS 43.1% 12 0 12
Internet Capital Group ICGE 36.0% 4 4 8
Infospace.com Inc. INSP 49.0% 19 1 20
Inktomi Corporation INKT 24.0% 38 0 38
InsWeb Corporation INSW 74.0% 1 0 1
Internet America Inc. GEEK 26.3% 11 0 11
internet.com Corporation INTM 64.0% 0 5 5
Intraware Inc. ITRA 47.1% 13 0 13
Intuit Inc. INTU 47.0% 1.6 20 0 20
Iss Group Inc. ISSX 54.0% 2.4 27 0 27
iTurf Inc. TURF 64.6% 2 0 2
iVillage Inc. IVIL 45.0% 1 2 3
Knight/Trimark Group Inc. NITE 46.0% 16 0 16
Liberate Technologies LBRT 59.1% 11 0 11
LookSmart Ltd. LOOK 77.0% 11 1 12
Lycos Inc. LCOS 30.0% 3.0 26 1 27
Marimba Inc. MRBA 41.2% 3 1 4
Media Metrix Inc. MMXI 35.9% 5 0 5
Modem Media.Poppe Tyson MMPT 70.9% 4 1 5
Multex.com Inc. MLTX 33.9% 5 0 5
Musicmaker.com Inc. HITS 74.5% 0 0 0
Nbc Internet Inc. NBCI 66.8% 7 0 7
Net Perceptions NETP 39.2% 6 2 8
NetObjects Inc. NETO 63.9% 3 0 3
Network Solutions Inc. NSOL 53.0% 3.2 16 1 17
Networks Associates Inc. NETA 24.0% 1.1 2 1 3
NextCard Inc. NXCD 54.0% 1 2 3
Northpoint Communications NPNT 73.6% 21 0 21
Open Market Inc. OMKT 18.1% 2.3 14 0 14
pcOrder.com Inc. PCOR 84.4% 8 0 8
Peapod Inc. PPOD 53.7% 1 15 4 19
Portal Software Inc. PRSF 62.9% 25 0 25
priceline.com Inc. PCLN 87.0% 20 1 21
Prodigy Communications PRGY 65.0% 8 1 9
Psinet Inc. PSIX 35.0% 1.5 3 0 3
Quokka Sports Inc. QKKA 81.1% 0 2 2
Razorfish Inc. RAZF 51.0% 3 0 3
RealNetworks Inc. RNWK 75.0% 2.3 22 0 22
Rowecom Inc. ROWE 70.2% 3 0 339
Scient Corp. SCNT 67.0% 10 1 11
Rsa Security Inc. RSAS 23.1% 2.4 24 0 24
Secure Computing Corp. SCUR 28.0% 1.6 2 4 6
Silknet Software Inc. SILK 56.1% 12 1 13
SportsLine.com Inc. SPLN 44.9% 1.1 9 0 9
Spyglass Inc. SPYG 9.3% 1.8 23 1 24
Stamps.com Inc. STMP 64.9% 3 2 5
StarMedia Network Inc. STRM 48.9% 5 0 5
Sterling Commerce Inc. SE 29.0% 1.7 6 0 6
Streamline.com Inc. SLNE 75.5% 3 3 6
Student Advantage Inc. STAD 75.0% 8 0 8
Cobalt Group Inc. CBLT 73.3% 1 6 7
theglobe.com inc. TGLO 58.0% 1 2 3
Ticketmaster Online-City TMCS 51.4% 9 1 10
TiVo Inc. TIVO 67.9% 0 0 0
Transaction Systems Arch. TSAI 21.0% 0.4 5 2 7
uBid Inc. UBID 13.1% 0 0 0
Us Search.com Inc. SRCH 65.6% 1 2 3
Value America Inc. VUSA 85.9% 3 1 4
Verio Inc. VRIO 32.0% 12 0 12
VeriSign Inc. VRSN 24.0% 1.8 61 0 61
VerticalNet Inc. VERT 58.0% 23 0 23
Vignette Corporation VIGN 17.0% 53 1 54
Wavo Corporation WAVO 33.0% 1.7 0 0 0
WebTrends Corporation WEBT 48.0% 30 0 30
WorldGate Communications WGAT 42.0% 14 1 15
Yahoo! Inc. YHOO 60.0% 3.3 19 0 19
Youbet.com Inc. UBET 28.1% 0 0 0
Mean 49.9% 1.96 11.2 1.0 12.2
Sum 1,276 118 1,394
How to read this appendix:
             For example, Cybershop.com Inc. or CYSP has an insider ownership of 46,8% and four inside
             sell transactions, no inside buy transactions and thus four total inside transactions.
            The beta for CYSP is not available.